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Abstract 
 
Since the mid-1990s the number of consumer insolvencies in England and Wales has 
grown exponentially. The UK’s Insolvency Act 1986 offers two formal responses to 
personal insolvency: bankruptcy and individual voluntary arrangements (“IVAs”). While 
consumers have used both these debt relief mechanisms in increasing numbers in recent 
years, IVAs − regulated agreements between debtors and creditors facilitated by a 
licensed insolvency practitioner, usually taking the form of a five-year payment plan − 
grew faster than bankruptcies between 2003 and 2006.  However, the level of new IVA 
approvals fell back in 2007 and the first half of 2008.  This article charts the 
transformation of the IVA from a bankruptcy alternative originally designed for insolvent 
traders and professionals into a tool of consumer debt relief.  It then seeks to explain 
both the stellar rise in IVA usage among consumer debtors and the subsequent stalling of 
IVA growth.  The rise of consumer IVAs can be attributed largely to supply side changes 
in the market for debt resolution − in particular the emergence of volume providers 
commonly referred to as ‘IVA factories’ − while a sustained backlash against the 
procedure and the providers instigated by institutional creditors demanding higher 
recoveries accounts for the subsequent decline in approvals.  The article concludes by 
considering the near-term prospects for consumer IVAs within the context of the 
increasingly complex UK debt resolution market. 
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Individual Voluntary Arrangements: A ‘Fresh Start’ 
for Salaried Consumer Debtors in England and Wales? 
Adrian Walters∗ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In its seminal report on the state of insolvency law in England and Wales published in 
1982 the Cork Committee made the following observations under the heading ‘the 
modern world of credit’:
1
 
 
In the present century, we have witnessed a rapid expansion from the most basic 
forms of consumer credit, in the shape of pawnbroking, tallymen and 
moneylending, to instalment credit offered by retailers and the massive 
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development in the area of hire-purchase finance.  We have lived through a sudden 
surge in the demand for motor cars, which has spilled over into the market for 
every kind of consumer goods… Since the mid 1960’s, we have experienced the 
rapid growth of the credit card business in its various forms which has greatly 
expanded the range of credit available… The increased opportunities for 
contracting debt have led to the emergence of the consumer debtor, a commonplace 
today, but virtually unknown in the Nineteenth Century.  A wage-earner, with little 
or no capital assets of any value, can today incur credit to an extent undreamed of a 
hundred years ago. 
 
Since 1982 the consumer lending revolution has accelerated beyond even the wildest 
expectations of the Cork Committee in many parts of the world.  Its momentum has 
derived from a number of structural factors: American-led deregulation of consumer 
lending;
2
 globalisation; technological developments that have enabled lenders to perform 
low-cost, computer-based credit checks on borrowers; and financial innovations such as 
securitisation.
3
  Not only has consumer credit expanded significantly over the last quarter 
of a century, its social penetration has deepened.  Through the development of sub-prime 
                                          
2
 Usually traced back to the United States Supreme Court decision in Marquette National Bank of 
Minneapolis v First of Omaha Service Corporation 439 US 299 (1978) which effectively neutralised state 
law interest rate ceilings on credit cards and thus increased the potential profitability of this type of lending. 
3
 I Ramsay, ‘Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy’ (2007) 1 University of Illinois LR 241, 243 and works 
therein cited.  On the role of information technology and financial innovation in transforming consumer 
lending (with particular reference to the United States but equally applicable in the United Kingdom 
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markets, the expansion of consumer credit has been accompanied by its so-called 
‘democratisation’,4 a process whereby mainstream credit has become available to lower 
income social groups to whom it was not traditionally available.  As a consequence of 
these structural changes many countries, including the United Kingdom, now have ‘credit 
societies’ − that is societies in which widespread consumer credit usage facilitated and 
encouraged by a functioning consumer credit market is seen as an essential pre-requisite 
of economic growth.5 
 The flipside of the consumer credit revolution is the phenomenon of rising 
consumer over-indebtedness.  Over-indebtedness has been defined and measured in 
various ways6 but is generally characterised by a situation in which the debt burden of 
individuals or households persistently exceeds their capacity to repay over the long term.7  
The problem of consumer over-indebtedness has prompted several jurisdictions to reform 
their insolvency laws
8
 and was a source of political concern in the United Kingdom even 
                                          
4
 J Niemi-Kiesiläinen, I Ramsay and W Whitford (eds), Consumer Bankruptcy in Global Perspective (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2003), 2-4. 
5
 J Niemi-Kiesiläinen and A Henrikson, ‘Legal Solutions to Debt Problems in Credit Societies – A Report 
to the Council of Europe’ (Umea University, 2005) 7. 
6
 European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 
‘Common Operational European Definition of Over-indebtedness’ (2007) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/docs/social_inclusion/2007/edo_summary_en.pdf> 3-4. 
7
 Niemi-Kiesiläinen & Henrikson (n 5) 7. 
8
 J Kilborn, Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy (Carolina Academic Press, Durham NC 2007) (chronicling 
developments in the United States, Europe and Scandinavia); J Ziegel, Comparative Consumer Insolvency 
Regimes − A Canadian Perspective (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2003) (comparing developments in North 
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before the ‘credit crunch’ of 2007, compounded by rising commodity prices, raised the 
spectre of recession or worse.9  Rising over-indebtedness has generated increased demand 
for debt advisory and debt resolution services10 and translated into exponential growth in 
absolute terms in the numbers of consumer debtors seeking access to formal insolvency 
proceedings in England and Wales.
11
  The upshot is that our insolvency system, which 
originated as an orderly collection apparatus for the creditors of insolvent traders, has 
                                                                                                                             
America, Europe, Scandinavia and Australia); Niemi-Kiesiläinen et al (n 4) (containing accounts from 
jurisdictions as diverse as China, Israel and Brazil). 
9
 The government launched an action plan for tackling consumer over-indebtedness in 2004 and the 
Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform issues an annual report: 
<http://www.berr.gov.uk/consumers/consumer-finance/over-indebtedness/index.html>.  See also the 
Griffiths Commission on Personal Debt, ‘What Price Credit?’ (2005) 
<http://www.niace.org.uk/news/Docs/Griffiths-report-on-personal-debt.pdf> (concluding that personal debt 
was a problem for roughly three million people in the UK but that increases in household debt to income 
ratios had left many families, especially those with low incomes, vulnerable to adverse changes in their 
circumstances or changes in the general economic outlook) and Social Justice Policy Group, ‘Breakdown 
Britain’ (2006) <http://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/default.asp?pageRef=180> (describing personal 
debt as a ‘time bomb’ which could potentially trigger a ‘severe debt crisis’). 
10
 See eg Citizens Advice, ‘Out of the Red – Debt Advice in the Citizens Advice Service’ (2006) 
<http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/index/publications/out_of_the_red.htm> 2-4 (reporting increase in 
consumer credit debt problems dealt with by bureaux). 
11
 The pattern in Scotland and Northern Ireland has been similar.  See Insolvency Service, ‘Enterprise Act 
2002 – the Personal Insolvency Provisions: Final Evaluation Report’ (2007) (‘Evaluation Report’) 
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/legislation/Reform.htm> 45-53.  On 
the legal framework for personal insolvency in Scotland which is a devolved matter in respect of which the 
Scottish Parliament has legislative competence see D McKenzie Skene and A Walters, ‘Consumer 
Bankruptcy Law Reform in Great Britain’ (2006) 80 American Bankruptcy LJ 477. 
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ceased to function primarily as a system for the adjustment of business debts.  Talk of a 
consumer-led ‘debt crisis’ or ‘bankruptcy crisis’ is now as fashionable in this 
jurisdiction12 as it was in the United States during the mid-1990s.13 
The main focus of this article is on the formal resolution of consumer debt 
problems in England and Wales under the Insolvency Act 1986 (‘IA 1986’).  IA 1986 
offers two formal responses to the insolvency of natural persons: bankruptcy and 
individual voluntary arrangements (‘IVAs’).  While over-indebted consumers have 
accessed both of these mechanisms in increasing numbers since the late-1990s,
14
 IVAs − 
which function as a form of debt repayment plan coupled with a partial discharge − grew 
faster than bankruptcies between 2003 and 2006.  On the statute book since the mid-
1980s, but little known outside the insolvency profession before the present decade, IVAs 
acquired a considerable public profile and notoriety as a consequence.
15
  However, the 
period of spectacular growth mid-decade was followed by one of relative stagnation.  The 
number of new IVA approvals fell back during 2007 and 2008.  This prompts the 
question: has the IVA had its day as a consumer ‘debt solution’? 
                                          
12
 See eg __‘Buy now, pay later culture sends personal insolvencies soaring’ Financial Times (London 6 
March 2006); __‘Personal insolvency rates at record as “debt crisis” deepens’ The Times (London 5 May 
2007). 
13
 See eg E Warren, ‘The Bankruptcy Crisis’ (1998) 73 Indiana LJ 1079; D Moss and G Johnson, ‘The Rise 
of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution or Both?’ (1999) 73 American Bankruptcy LJ 311. 
14
 Evaluation Report (n 11) 29-31. 
15
 See eg __‘Sharp rise in use of IVAs to clear debt’ Financial Times (London 4 November 2006); __‘IVAs 
are the new face of debt but they mask an age-old truth’ Independent on Sunday (London 5 November 
2006). 
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After presenting the official statistics on the incidence of formal insolvencies in 
the period 1998 to 2007 and sketching the legal, institutional and functional 
characteristics of the main debt resolution options available to over-indebted consumers 
in England and Wales, this article seeks to cast light on two puzzles about IVAs.  Firstly, 
why did IVA growth outstrip the rate of growth of bankruptcies between 2003 and 2006 
and, in particular, why did it continue to do so even after the bankruptcy regime became 
(so many have claimed) more ‘debtor friendly’ following the coming into force of the 
relevant provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002 on 1 April 2004?  Secondly, why did IVA 
growth stall thereafter? 
The main threads of the account are as follows.  The emergence of IVAs can only 
be properly understood by reference to the evolution of the consumer IVA market and the 
role and behaviour of the main actors within that market place.  Accordingly, IVA growth 
has been primarily market-driven rather than law-driven.  Moreover, the market 
transformation of the IVA from a modest bankruptcy alternative used by self-employed 
traders and professionals to a volume consumer ‘debt solution’ has occurred within a 
broadly supportive policy environment.  In current policy discourse, the IVA is presented 
as the best means by which an appropriate balance between the interests of salaried 
consumer debtors and their creditors can be struck.  IVAs offer what may be termed an 
‘earned fresh start’
16
 in which debtors receive a partial discharge of past indebtedness 
accompanied by the prospect of wider financial rehabilitation in return for repaying what 
they can reasonably afford from present and future income over a predictable time period.  
The theoretical attractiveness of this ‘earned fresh start’ policy is difficult to contest in 
                                          
16
 Niemi-Kiesiläinen & Henrikson (n 5) 45-46. 
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the conditions of a modern ‘credit society’.  However, its fate in practice appears to rest 
upon the outcome of processes of conflict and co-operation between ‘repeat players’ 
within the maturing and increasingly complex debt resolution market. 
 
THE CONSUMER INSOLVENCY ‘BOOM’ IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
 
Official data on the incidence of personal insolvency proceedings 
 
Table 1 and Figure 1 present the official data on the incidence of formal personal 
insolvencies in England and Wales − that is, bankruptcies and IVAs − for the period 1998 
to 2007.  Basic details of every new bankruptcy and IVA are required to be entered on a 
statutory register.
17
  As a consequence, both bankruptcies and IVAs are counted in the 
official data. 
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 Insolvency Rules 1986 SI 1986/1925 (‘IR 1986’) rr 6A.1-6A.5. 
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Table 1: Individual Insolvencies (Bankruptcies and IVAs) in England and Wales, 
1998-2007 
 
YEAR BANKRUPTCY 
ORDERS 
IVAs TOTAL 
1998 19,647 4,902 24,549 
1999 21,611 7,195 28,806 
2000 21,550 7,978 29,528 
2001 23,477 6,298 29,775 
2002 24,292 6,295 30,587 
2003 28,021 7,583 35,604 
2004 35,898 10,752 46,650 
2005 47,291 20,293 67,584 
2006 62,956 44,332 107,288 
2007 64,481 42,166 106,647 
Source: UK Insolvency Service 
 
 
Figure 1: Individual Insolvencies (Bankruptcies and IVAs) in England and Wales, 
1998-2007 
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These official data reveal the extent of the ‘boom’ in absolute terms.  Total numbers of 
bankruptcies and IVAs were relatively flat at around 25,000 to 30,000 per annum from 
Pr -Print
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the late 1990s until around 2002.  After 2003 there was a steep acceleration, total 
numbers exceeding 100,000 per annum for the first time in 2006, before levelling out in 
2007.  By comparison, at the height of the recession in the early-1990s total individual 
insolvencies peaked in the region of 37,000 of which the vast majority were bankruptcies.  
IVA numbers did not break out of a range between 4,000 and 8,000 per annum until 
2004.
18
 
Since the early-1990s, the demographics of individual insolvency in England and 
Wales have also been transformed in line with the process of consumer credit expansion 
described earlier.  Using self-employment and salaried employment as proxies to classify 
individuals as business or consumer debtors, the UK’s Insolvency Service has shown that 
since 1998 the level of bankruptcies based on business debts remained constant at around 
10,000 per annum
19
 with the implication that consumer debtors account for all of the 
growth in bankruptcy numbers.  Similarly, the available evidence suggests that the vast 
majority of debtors entering IVAs are non-traders in salaried employment
20
 whereas 
during the 1990s IVAs were almost exclusively the preserve of the self-employed.
21
 
                                          
18
 For longer run data from 1960 to 2007 see 
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/otherinformation/statistics/historicdata/HDmenu.htm>. 
19
 Evaluation Report (n 11) 30. 
20
 PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘Living on Tick: The 21
st
 Century Debtor’ (2006) (‘Living on Tick’) 
<http://www.pwc.co.uk/eng/publications/Living_on_tick_21st_century_debtor.html>; Insolvency Service, 
‘Survey of Debtors and Supervisors of Individual Voluntary Arrangements’ (2008) 
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/policychange/policychange.htm> 28. 
21
 K Pond, ‘The Individual Voluntary Arrangement Experience’, [1995] JBL 118; ‘An Insolvent Decade: 
The Changing Nature of the IVA 1987-1997’ (1998) Loughborough University Banking Centre Research 
Paper Series No. 125/98 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=139556>. 
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Per capita incidence of personal insolvency proceedings 
 
The aggregate figures need to be put into context by adjusting for population size.  Per 
capita rates of individual insolvencies throughout the United Kingdom are historically 
low compared to equivalent rates in North America.
22
  Within the UK, the per capita 
incidence of individual insolvencies has been consistently higher in Scotland (which in 
mid-2006 contained only 8.4 per cent of the UK population) than it has been in England 
and Wales (which in mid-2006 together contained 88.7 per cent of the UK population).
23
  
Around two in every thousand of the populace entered bankruptcy or an IVA in England 
and Wales during 2006.  In Scotland, the figure for individuals entering sequestration or a 
protected trust deed (the Scottish equivalents) was nearer three in every thousand.  
Expressed in terms of overall population, Scots are more likely to end up in a formal 
insolvency process than inhabitants of England and Wales and, despite the growth in 
absolute numbers evident from Table 1 and Figure 1 above, the per capita incidence of 
individual insolvency in England and Wales remains stubbornly low compared with that 
in other jurisdictions.  The low per capita rate tends to gainsay any suggestion that the 
absolute numbers are evidence of an ‘over-indebtedness crisis’ although, it may in part 
                                          
22
 For comparable data at least up to 2003 see R Efrat, ‘Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy’ (2002) 76 
American Bankruptcy LJ 81; Ziegel (n 8).  See also R Mann, Charging Ahead – The Growth and 
Regulation of Payment Card Markets (CUP, Cambridge 2006) 65 showing that the UK had the lowest per 
capita filing rates in 2002 compared with Australia, Canada, Japan and the US. 
23
 Population data is available from the Office of National Statistics: 
<http://www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nugget.asp?ID=6>. 
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reflect the availability of informal methods of debt resolution (discussed further below).  
In other words, there may be many more debtors in England and Wales who are eligible 
for formal insolvency proceedings that end up pursuing informal resolution outside of IA 
1986 and so do not register in the official data.  This carries the obvious implication that 
the rate of formal insolvencies is an incomplete measure of ‘over-indebtedness’.  It is 
beyond the scope of the present article to explore any further the reasons behind 
variations in per capita individual insolvency rates across countries.
24
 
 
Changes in the incidence of IVAs relative to bankruptcies 
 
Figure 1 shows that between 2003 and 2006 bankruptcies grew virtually in a straight line.  
Strikingly, in the same period, as Figure 1 shows and Table 2 below underscores, IVA 
numbers grew year on year at a significantly faster rate than bankruptcy numbers, albeit 
from a lower threshold.  Year on year, bankruptcies grew steadily while IVA growth sky-
rocketed culminating in the more than doubling of IVA numbers in 2006 compared to 
2005.  Furthermore, a cursory glance at Table 1 shows that by 2006 IVAs had come to 
account for over 40 per cent of individual insolvencies under IA 1986.  However, in 
2007, bankruptcies grew year on year by a modest 2.4 per cent whereas IVAs declined 
year on year by nearly 5 per cent.  Thus, it was the decline in IVA numbers that 
                                          
24
 Ronald Mann has suggested that variations may be attributable to a bundle of variables: different levels 
of indebtedness; different cultural attitudes to financial failure; the accessibility of the legal system as a 
source of bankruptcy relief; the availability of informal systems of relief.  See R Mann, ‘Making Sense of 
Nation-Level Bankruptcy Filing Rates’ (4 February 2008) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090609> 7. 
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accounted for the small decline in total numbers of individual insolvencies during 2007.  
The trend of declining IVA numbers as a proportion of total individual insolvencies has 
continued in the first two quarters of 2008.25 
 
Table 2: Percentage year on year increase in individual insolvencies in England and 
Wales (2003-2007) 
 
YEAR TOTAL BANKRUPTCIES IVAs 
2003 16.4% 15.3% 20.4% 
2004 31.0% 28.1% 41.7% 
2005 44.8% 31.7% 88.7% 
2006 58.7% 33.1% 118.4% 
2007 − 0.6% 2.4% − 4.9% 
 
The impact of the Enterprise Act 2002 
 
With effect from 1 April 2004 the Enterprise Act 2002 made several changes to personal 
insolvency law in England and Wales.  These changes − widely perceived to have 
liberalised the bankruptcy regime − are an important part of the legal backdrop to the 
rising numbers of formal insolvencies experienced between 2003 and 2006.  Perhaps 
ironically given the prevailing demographics, the policy which animated the Enterprise 
Act changes was business-oriented.  The starting point was the general proposition that 
fear of failure operates as a cultural disincentive to entrepreneurial activity.  
Policymakers claimed that personal insolvency law − and, in particular, the law relating 
to bankruptcy − gave rise to stigma which had the effect of reinforcing the disincentive. 
                                          
25
 Insolvency Service, ‘Statistics Release: Insolvencies in Second Quarter 2008’ (1 August 2008) 
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/otherinformation/statistics/200808/index.htm>. 
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The Enterprise Act therefore introduced structural reforms designed to encourage 
entrepreneurship by making bankruptcy more accommodating and correspondingly less 
‘fear-inducing’ or ‘stigmatising’ for entrepreneurs who expose themselves to failure by 
taking socially desirable business risks in good faith.
26
  Firstly, it provides that debtors 
entering bankruptcy will have their debts discharged automatically after one year (rather 
than three years under the old law) and allows for the possibility of an even earlier 
discharge where the official receiver concludes that an investigation of the bankrupt’s 
conduct and affairs is unnecessary.
27
 
Secondly, it lifted many of the extensive restrictions, disqualifications and 
prohibitions that the law had previously imposed on bankrupts the function of which was 
to castigate bankruptcy as a form of social and moral failure.  The English policy of 
deliberately stigmatising debtors who access the bankruptcy regime through the 
imposition of legal prohibitions was historically extensive and pervasive in scope.  It 
reflected a deep-seated normative tendency towards the view that failure to pay debts (as 
                                          
26
 Insolvency Service, ‘Bankruptcy: A Fresh Start—A Consultation on Possible Reform to the Law 
Relating to Personal Insolvency in England and Wales’ (2000); Department of Trade and Industry, 
‘Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency—A Second Chance’ (Cm 5234, 2001); D Milman, Personal 
Insolvency Law, Regulation and Policy (Ashgate, Aldershot 2005); A Walters, ‘Personal Insolvency Law 
After the Enterprise Act: An Appraisal’ (2005) 5 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 65; G Wilson and S 
Wilson, ‘Responsible Risk-Takers: Notions of Directorial Responsibility − Past, Present and Future’ (2001) 
1 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 211. 
27
 Official receivers are state officials who act as receivers and managers in all bankruptcy cases pending 
appointment by the creditors of a private sector trustee and who are statutorily obliged to investigate the 
conduct and affair of every bankrupt unless they think that an investigation is unnecessary.  See IA 1986 ss 
287, 289, 399-401 and text to nn 54-58. 
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evidenced by admission to the bankruptcy regime) casts doubt on moral character and the 
capacity for financial responsibility and stewardship.  A handful of restrictions and 
disabilities still remain.  For example, there are statutory restrictions on undischarged 
bankrupts acting as company directors
28
 or obtaining credit without disclosing their 
bankruptcy.
29
  However, the policy of stigmatising personal financial failure has been 
significantly relaxed.  There is an array of public and private offices to which debtors are 
no longer denied access simply because they are bankrupt.
30
 
Thirdly, the Act not only removed restrictions that previously applied to 
bankrupts per se, it also sought to discriminate more effectively between non-culpable 
and culpable bankrupts by introducing a new post-discharge restrictions system, 
modelled on the Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 1986.  This system is designed 
to penalise dishonest or irresponsible debtors who, by reason of their past misconduct, are 
deemed unworthy of a full ‘fresh start.’
31
  A debtor subject to post-discharge restrictions 
is prohibited from acting in various capacities (such as a company director or an 
insolvency practitioner) and from obtaining credit above a prescribed level without 
                                          
28
 Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 1986 s 11. 
29
 IA 1986 s 360(1)(a). 
30
 Enterprise Act 2002 ss 265-267 lift the automatic prohibition on an undischarged bankrupt being or 
becoming a Justice of the Peace, an MP or a member of a local authority.  See also Enterprise Act 2002 
(Disqualification from Office: General) Order 2006 SI 2006/1722 made by the Secretary of State pursuant 
to powers contained in Enterprise Act 2002 s 268. 
31
 A Walters & M Davis-White QC, Directors’ Disqualification and Bankruptcy Restrictions (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 2005) 529-572. 
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disclosing the existence of the restrictions.
32
  Post-discharge restrictions can be imposed 
by the court on the application of the official receiver or, where the debtor consents, by 
means of a binding undertaking, for up to fifteen years.33  Post-discharge restrictions do 
not affect the entitlement to automatic discharge.
34
  As conceived, they restrict the 
culpable debtor’s ability to re-enter and participate in ‘credit society’, thus confining the 
scope of the fresh start to discharge of pre-bankruptcy debts.  They are noted on a public 
register and so are matters of public record.
35
  The underlying theory was that the 
combination of a general relaxation of restrictions on undischarged bankrupts and a 
system of desert-based post-discharge restrictions would improve the information 
available to credit markets and affect credit scoring by enabling lenders to differentiate 
more easily between culpable and non-culpable debtors.36 
Although these changes were primarily intended to remove barriers to 
entrepreneurship, they were universal in effect.  Bankruptcy in England and Wales 
remains a unitary regime accessible to all debtors, not just business debtors.  The 
Enterprise Act is generally perceived as having made bankruptcy more ‘debtor-
friendly’.
37
  Some claimed at the outset that the reduction in the duration of bankruptcy 
                                          
32
 IA 1986 s 360(5). 
33
 Ibid s 281A, sch 4A.  On the official receiver see further text to nn 54-58. 
34
 The only ground for suspending discharge is where debtors fail to comply with their statutory obligations 
to the official receiver and/or to their trustee in bankruptcy: see IA 1986 s 279(3)-(4).  There are no grounds 
for absolute denial of discharge. 
35
 IR 1986 rr 6A.6-6A.7. 
36
 Evaluation Report (n 11) 10, 19, 86, 97-98. 
37
 For a balanced view see __‘Forgive and Forget?’ The Economist (London 4 March 2004). 
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would encourage reckless borrowing and cause or contribute to accelerating numbers of 
personal insolvencies generally and of consumer insolvencies more specifically.  With 
personal insolvencies now running at over 100,000 per annum, this view still persists.38 
Of greater significance to the present discussion, it was also widely predicted that, 
in making bankruptcy relatively more attractive (at least for the non-culpable), the 
reforms would cause IVAs to wither on the vine.
39
  It became commonplace for 
commentators to contemplate the possible death of the IVA.  And yet, as we have seen, 
while bankruptcies continued to grow fast in the immediate aftermath of the Enterprise 
Act, IVAs − which were untouched by the Enterprise Act − grew twice as fast!  This 
brings me to the central questions of this article.  How do we explain the growth in IVAs 
relative to bankruptcies between 2003 and 2006?  Why did IVAs continue to grow 
exponentially between 1 April 2004 and the end of 2006 in the face of the widely-held 
belief that the Enterprise Act would have a contrary effect?  Why did IVA growth grind 
to a halt in 2007?  As a necessary preamble to the discussion of these puzzles, the next 
section provides an account of the main options currently available for addressing 
consumer over-indebtedness in England and Wales explaining their principal legal and 
institutional features. 
                                          
38
 See __‘Lax British bankruptcy rules worsen credit crunch’ The Times (London 2 May 2008).  The 
government is more sanguine. Cf. Evaluation Report (n 11) 27-30, 45-53 and works therein cited 
(emphasising the structural relationship between the rate of incidence of personal insolvency proceedings 
and changes in the credit market). 
39
 P Boyden, ‘Individual Voluntary Arrangement’ Recovery (Spring 2004) 18; Milman (n 26) 136-137; 
Walters (n 26). 
Pr -Prin
 18 
DEBT RESOLUTION OPTIONS FOR CONSUMER DEBTORS 
 
Over-indebted consumers in England and Wales are confronted by a diverse and complex 
matrix of ‘options’ for dealing with their debt problems in an evolving market populated 
by a range of public, private and third sector provision.  The Insolvency Practices 
Council, a public interest body that forms part of the regulatory framework for insolvency 
practitioners, has described the marketplace as ‘confused’ and ‘populated by an “alphabet 
soup” of debt advisers and “debt solutions” without adequate objective information about 
their pros and cons and performance’.
40
  Against that background, the ‘options’ 
considered in this section divide into two groups: formal options under the IA 1986 (ie 
bankruptcies and IVAs) and informal options available outside the insolvency system, 
principally debt management plans and various forms of refinancing.
41
 
 
Bankruptcy 
 
Bankruptcy under Part IX of IA 1986 amounts to a statutory bargain which seeks to 
balance the interests of debtors and creditors.  The making of a bankruptcy order stays 
individual enforcement by creditors against the debtor42 and so, in theory, should stop 
                                          
40
 Insolvency Practices Council, Annual Report 2007 
<http://www.insolvencypractices.org.uk/reports/2007/annual_report.htm> 4. 
41
 Pt V of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 reforms county court administration orders and 
has added further formal mechanisms − enforcement restrictions orders, debt relief orders and debt 
repayment plans − but these provisions are not yet in force and are subject to further consultation. 
42
 IA 1986 s 285(3).  It does not affect the enforcement rights of secured creditors: IA 1986 s 285(4). 
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creditor harassment.  No later than one year from the date of the order the bankrupt is 
automatically discharged,43 the effect of discharge being to release the bankrupt from his 
or her ‘bankruptcy debts’, meaning the debts or liabilities to which he or she was subject 
at the commencement of bankruptcy.
44
  Discharge is central to the Anglo-American 
theory of the ‘fresh start’, the idea in the celebrated language of the United States 
Supreme Court that bankruptcy law should give ‘the honest but unfortunate debtor…a 
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and 
discouragement of pre-existing debt.’
45
 
 In return for these benefits, debtors are required to surrender all their non-exempt 
property.  This forms the bankruptcy estate the proceeds of which are used to pay 
creditors.46  Tools of trade and basic domestic necessities are exempt property and so fall 
outside the estate.
47
  The policy is that debtors should not be reduced to utter penury or be 
inhibited from earning a livelihood.  Bankruptcy has its most significant impact on 
debtors who own their homes (whether solely or jointly).  The debtor’s interest forms part 
of the estate.  The home may therefore have to be sold in order to unlock its economic 
value for the benefit of creditors, although there are a number of rules that afford some 
                                          
43
 Ibid s 279 and text to n 27. 
44
 Ibid ss 281, 382.  Some debts are treated as non-dischargeable for policy reasons (eg criminal penalties, 
debts arising from fraud or fraudulent breach of trust, debts arising under a court order made in family 
proceedings, student loans).  Discharge does not affect the enforcement rights of secured creditors. 
45
 Local Loan Co v Hunt 292 US 234, 244 (1934).  See also INSOL International, ‘Consumer Debt Report 
– Report of Findings and Recommendations’ (2001) <http://www.insol.org/pdf/consdebt.pdf> 22; Niemi-
Kiesiläinen & Henrikson (n 5) 45-46. 
46
 IA 1986 ss 281(1), 283, 283A, 306-308A, 436. 
47
 Ibid s 283(2). 
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protection to debtors and their families in connection with the realisation of their interest 
in a dwelling house which is their sole or principal residence.48 
 As well as surrendering assets, debtors who are in receipt of regular income 
(usually by virtue of salaried employment) may also be required to make payments from 
income.  Strictly, income arising after the making of a bankruptcy order does not form 
part of the bankruptcy estate.
49
  However, the possibility of capturing the debtor’s 
ongoing surplus income for creditors has been a feature of our bankruptcy regime since 
the Bankruptcy Act 1914.  The current position in England and Wales is that debtors can 
be required to make contributions from surplus income for up to a maximum of three 
years under an income payments order or agreement.50  Income payments can only be 
required if they do not reduce the income of debtors below what appears to be necessary 
for meeting their and their families’ reasonable domestic needs.  ‘Reasonable domestic 
needs’ is a flexible standard designed to balance the interests of debtors and creditors, the 
overall policy being to ensure that debtors contribute what they can reasonably afford for 
a finite period from future income and are not permitted to maintain extravagant lifestyles 
                                          
48
 Ibid ss 283A (bankrupt’s interest in dwelling house automatically ceases to be comprised in the estate 
three years after date of commencement of bankruptcy if steps not taken to realise interest), 313A (stays 
order for sale, possession or charge where value of bankrupt’s interest in dwelling house is less than a de 
minimis, currently £1,000), 335A (one year stay of order for sale of family dwelling house to protect the 
interests of the bankrupt’s partner and dependants). 
49
 Ibid s 307(5). 
50
 Ibid ss 310-310A.  See further the Insolvency Service’s in-house Technical Manual, ch 31.7 and Case 
Help Manual <http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/freedomofinformation/index.htm>.  See also Evaluation 
Report (n 11) 125-138; Milman (n 26) 126-129; Ziegel (n 8) 116-118; G Miller, ‘Income Payment Orders’ 
(2002) 18 Insolvency Law & Practice 43. 
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at their creditors’ expense.  In legal terms, it can be seen that there is a quid pro quo for 
bankruptcy’s ‘fresh start’.  Debtors must surrender non-exempt assets, may have to make 
income payments, are subject to some legal restrictions and, if their conduct is deemed 
sufficiently culpable, they run the risk of post-discharge restrictions.
51
 
Bankruptcy is initiated either by hostile creditors or debtors themselves by means 
of an application to the High Court or a county court having insolvency jurisdiction.
52
  
The vast majority of bankruptcy orders are self-initiated: so-called ‘debtor own’ 
petitions.
53
  All bankruptcies are processed by the official receiver (‘OR’) attached to the 
relevant court who initially serves as receiver and manager of the bankruptcy estate.
54
.  
ORs are state officials employed by the Insolvency Service, an executive agency of the 
Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, in various locations 
                                          
51
 On bankruptcy restrictions see further text to nn 28-36. 
52
 IA 1986 ss 264-268, 272, 373-374.  The threshold for eligibility is that the debtor is unable to pay his 
debts. 
53
 According to Ministry of Justice statistics, 73,270 bankruptcy petitions were filed in 2007.  Of these, 
53,114 (72.5 per cent) were ‘debtor own’ petitions and 20,156 (27.5 per cent) were creditor petitions: 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/insolvency-bulletin-2007-q4.pdf>.  The rise in ‘debtor own’ petitions has 
led to increased pressure on the court service and prompted urgent reconsideration of the role of the court 
in this aspect of bankruptcy process: see Insolvency Service, ‘Bankruptcy: proposals for reform of the 
debtor petition process’ (2007) 
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/con_doc_register/Initialstageconsultati
onpaper.doc>. 
54
 IA 1986 s 287. 
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throughout England and Wales.
55
  They are statutory office holders as well as civil 
servants who handle both bankruptcies and compulsory liquidations of insolvent 
companies.56  They have a statutory duty to investigate the conduct and affairs of every 
bankrupt
57
 in the discharge of which they act in the interests of creditors and in the wider 
public interest.  One of the OR’s first acts is to publicise the bankruptcy order by 
advertising it in the press and the London Gazette and by entering the details on the 
statutory insolvency register.
58
 
Once the official receiver has completed an initial enquiry into the debtor’s 
financial affairs, it is open to the creditors or the government to appoint a private sector 
insolvency practitioner (‘IP’) to act as trustee in bankruptcy in succession to the OR.59  In 
practice, this only happens if the debtor’s estate is complex, there are sufficient assets to 
make the appointment worthwhile taking into account the trustee’s expenses and 
remuneration or there are matters worthy of investigation which may lead to recovery of 
assets and so increase returns to creditors.  A trustee must be a licensed IP authorised to 
take insolvency appointments under Part XIII of IA 1986 by one of several recognised 
                                          
55
 IA 1986 s 287.  For the OR network see <http://www.insolvency-service.co.uk/officemap.htm>.  The 
Insolvency Service has both operational responsibility for the ORs and policy responsibility in the field of 
insolvency law. 
56
 On the origins and history of the OR see V Markham Lester, Victorian Insolvency: Bankruptcy, 
Imprisonment for Debt, and Company Winding-Up in Nineteenth Century England (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1995) 170-221.  On the nature of the OR’s statutory office see IA 1986 ss 399-401; Re Pantmaenog 
Timber Co Ltd [2003] UKHL 49, [2004] 1 AC 158 [43]-[46]. 
57
 IA 1986 s 289. 
58
 IR 1986 rr 6.46(2), 6A.4. 
59
 IA 1986 ss 292-296. 
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self-regulatory organisations which include the main accountancy bodies.
60
  In the event 
that an IP is not appointed, the OR becomes trustee.61 
Overall then, bankruptcy is administrative rather than judicial in character 
although it is initiated in court and subject ultimately to judicial oversight.  On paper 
there is a division of labour between the state and the IP profession in running the 
process.  However, it is understood anecdotally that, in practice, there are rarely any 
significant assets in consumer bankruptcies.  The implication is that many of these cases 
are retained and administered by the OR.  The Insolvency Service also has a policy of 
retaining cases that involve straightforward asset realisations on the premise that these 
cases can be administered cost effectively in the public sector.62  The picture of the 
consumer bankruptcy system that emerges is one in which the state plays the dominant 
role.  In this system, case administration is funded from fees that debtors are charged as a 
pre-condition to entering bankruptcy and from the proceeds generated from any assets 
and income payments.  The OR charges a flat case administration fee for the work done 
in the initial enquiry phase and, where a private sector trustee is not appointed, a so-
                                          
60
 The licensing framework for IPs which was established in the mid-1980s is set out in IA 1986 ss 388-
398.  For further background see V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (CUP, 
Cambridge 2002) ch 5; T Halliday and B Carruthers, ‘The Moral Regulation of Markets: Professions, 
Privatization and the English Insolvency Act 1986’ (1996) 21 Accounting, Organizations and Society 371, 
399-405; A Walters and M Seneviratne, ‘Complaints Handling in the UK Insolvency Practitioners 
Profession’ (2008) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1094757>. 
61
 IA 1986 ss 293(3), 295(4). 
62
 On the controversy provoked by this policy within the IP profession see L Brittain, ‘The disappearance of 
the OR’s rota’ Recovery (Autumn 2006) 3; G Pettit, ‘A level playing field’ Recovery (Autumn 2007) 3; L 
Cramp, ‘A better deal for creditors’ Recovery (Winter 2007) 2. 
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called Secretary of State fee which is calculated as a set percentage of asset realisations.  
These fees are designed to ensure that, in so far as possible, the OR recoups the full cost 
of case administration.  The fees are calibrated in such a way that cases in which there are 
assets of value in the estate to some extent cross-subsidise cases in which there are few or 
no assets.
63
  Thus, consumer bankruptcy can be theorised as a service provided by the 
state the costs of which are largely borne by its users − that is, debtors and creditors.  This 
contrasts with consumer IVA provision which, as we will see, is much more of a private 
sector concern. 
 
IVAs 
 
For centuries debtors have been able to enter into a composition or an assignment for the 
benefit of creditors with creditor consent under the general law, although the provision of 
statutory alternatives to bankruptcy modelled on such techniques goes back only as far as 
the early nineteenth century.
64
  IVAs are binding consensual agreements between debtors 
and creditors facilitated by an IP within the parameters of a statutory framework.  They 
were first introduced in the mid-1980s to provide an alternative to the little used deed of 
arrangement procedure.  As originally conceived, they were intended to provide a 
bankruptcy alternative for self-employed traders and professionals.  The Cork 
Committee, whose recommendations led to the enactment of IA 1986, envisaged that the 
main user groups would be personal guarantors of corporate debts, members of 
                                          
63
 See further Insolvency Service, Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07 (HC 752) 13-14. 
64
 Lord Eldon’s Act, 1825 6 Geo. 4, c. 16.  See also Cork Report (n 1) 14-35, Milman (n 26) 130-137; 
Markham Lester (n 56) 34-36. 
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professions not permitted to take advantage of limited liability and unincorporated traders 
with sizeable gross business assets.65  As bankruptcy restrictions have traditionally 
impacted through statutory or professional rules on the debtor’s freedom to practice 
various professions, IVAs also offered a method whereby professionals could seek formal 
debt relief without necessarily having to forfeit their professional status.  The idea of 
debtors and creditors reaching a binding agreement that would enable debtors to avoid 
bankruptcy was not novel.  What was new was the statutory modus operandi. 
Debtors who wish to achieve a resettlement of their debts through an IVA must 
start by making a proposal to their creditors.  The proposal is usually put forward as a 
means of avoiding bankruptcy but it is also possible for a debtor who has gone bankrupt 
to make an IVA proposal with a view to having the bankruptcy annulled.66  IVAs are 
flexible.  They give scope for debtors to make affordable contributions from assets, 
ongoing income or third party funds, subject to creditor approval.  Ultimately, an IVA 
stands or falls depending on what the creditors are prepared to accept.  This is because an 
IVA only becomes legally binding if it is approved by in excess of 75% of the creditors 
by value.
67
  Once an IVA is approved it binds all creditors who were entitled to vote by 
virtue of section 260 of IA 1986 regardless of whether or not they attended the creditors’ 
                                          
65
 Cork Report (n 1) 91-92. 
66
 IA 1986 ss 261, 263(A)-(G).  There are analogies with payment plan alternatives such as the consumer 
proposal under Part III 2 of the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the bankruptcy alternatives in 
Parts IX-X of the Australian Bankruptcy Act.  See generally Ziegel (n 8). 
67
 IA 1986 ss 257-258, 260; IR 1986 r 5.23.  Strictly, the IVA takes effect if it is approved by in excess of 
75% by value of creditors who actually cast their vote one way or the other.  Creditors who are on notice 
but choose not to vote are ignored. 
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meeting or how they voted.  IVAs are therefore contracts which are given statutory force 
so that (in American parlance) dissenting creditors can be crammed down.68 
 There are very few limits on what can be agreed.  Creditors can demand 
modifications to the proposal before approving it.
69
  There are no statutory parameters 
governing the duration of an IVA.  However, in practice, in the case of consumer IVAs 
based on monthly contributions from income, the current market expectation among 
institutional creditors such as banks and credit card issuers is that the IVA will run for 
five years.
70
  The only statutory controls are on terms which affect the right of secured 
creditors to enforce their security or the treatment of preferential creditors.  Terms of this 
nature cannot be approved without the concurrence of the affected creditors.71  Thus, an 
IVA is primarily a tool for resettling ordinary unsecured debts.  Debtors who are home 
owners must keep up their mortgagee repayments to avoid repossession and those 
repayments will have to be taken into account in working out what they can afford to 
contribute into an IVA. 
 In order to propose an IVA, the debtor must enlist the services of an IP.  IPs assist 
debtors in setting up IVAs and supervise their implementation, services for which they 
earn fees.  The IP profession currently enjoys a statutory monopoly over IVA provision 
as by law a licensed IP is required to be involved in setting up and implementing an 
                                          
68
 Re N T Gallagher & Son Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 404, [2002] 1 WLR 2380 [4]. 
69
 Ibid s 258(2)-(5). 
70
 Living on Tick (n 20).  A five-year payment plan is the default model under the IVA Protocol: see text to 
nn 140-141. 
71
 IA 1986 s 258(4)-(5).  Preferential creditors are unsecured creditors who have statutory priority in 
bankruptcy over the general body of unsecured creditors: IA 1986 ss 328, 386, sch 6. 
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IVA.
72
  The process as envisaged by the statute is a follows.  The debtor contacts an IP 
who assists in the drawing up of the proposal73 based on information provided by the 
debtor about his or her financial affairs.  Once the proposal has been drafted, the IP 
agrees to act in the statutory parlance as ‘the nominee’.  As nominee, the IP is statutorily 
obliged to report to the court on whether the proposed IVA has a reasonable prospect of 
being approved and implemented before then convening a creditors’ meeting which votes 
on whether or not to approve the proposal.
74
  The IP is also obliged by professional rules 
to be satisfied that debtors considering making a proposal have received advice about 
their available options, including bankruptcy.
75
 
If the IVA is approved, there is a change of role: the IP ceases to be ‘the nominee’ 
and becomes ‘the supervisor’.76  The primary legal responsibility of the supervisor is to 
oversee implementation of the IVA, collect and distribute the debtor’s payments net of 
                                          
72
 IA 1986 ss 388(2)(c), 389.  Section 389A (introduced by the Insolvency Act 2000) provides scope for 
diluting the IP monopoly by allowing the Secretary of State to recognise bodies that could authorise non-
IPs to act in relation to individual and/or corporate voluntary arrangements.  To date, no such body has 
been recognised under this provision. 
73
 IA 1986 ss 253 (with interim order), 256A (without interim order).  The vast majority of IVAs are 
proposed without an application first being made to court for an interim order (a form of moratorium on 
collection efforts by individual creditors) under the section 256A procedure which was introduced by the 
Insolvency Act 2000. 
74
 IA 1986 ss 256, 256A, 257. 
75
 See Statement of Insolvency Practice 3 (England and Wales), Version 4 (effective April 2007) 
<http://www.r3.org.uk/publications/?p=80>.  The debtor must be provided with a copy of the booklet ‘Is a 
Voluntary Arrangement right for me?’ (revd edn, April 2004) <http://www.r3.org.uk/publications/?p=80>. 
76
 IA 1986 s 263(2). 
Pr -Print
 28 
his or her fees and ensure that the debtor complies with the approved IVA terms.  The 
supervisor is also required to report annually to the creditors on the progress of the IVA.  
If the debtor’s financial circumstances worsen over the lifetime of the arrangement − if, 
for example, the debtor becomes ill or loses his or her job − the supervisor may need to 
broker a variation of the IVA terms.  Although, as nominee, the IP is obliged to report to 
the court on the viability of the proposal and the outcome of the creditors’ meeting,
77
 the 
court has no role in the approval process unless there is some irregularity.
78
  An IVA is 
essentially a private deal between the debtor and the creditors with very few legal limits 
on what can be agreed which is subject to professional regulation
79
 and limited oversight 
by the court.80 
 
Advantages of IVAs for consumer debtors 
 
In theory, IVAs have a range of potential advantages for debtors when compared to 
bankruptcy.  Consumer debtors may prefer an IVA to other options, including 
bankruptcy, for the following reasons: 
 
                                          
77
 IA 1986 ss 256, 256A, 259. 
78
 IA 1986 s 262.  The decision of the creditors’ meeting to approve an IVA can be challenged by a 
dissenting creditor on limited grounds within the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the IP 
reports the outcome to the court in accordance with section 259. 
79
 Statement of Insolvency Practice 3 (n 75).  The contents of Statements of Insolvency Practice are agreed 
by all of the various IP licensing bodies and they therefore govern all IPs. 
80
 IA 1986 ss 262, 263. 
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1. An approved IVA will invariably provide for a stay on individual collection efforts 
and freeze interest on outstanding debts.  These terms are industry standard and have 
the effect that consumer debtors are no worse off in these respects in an IVA than 
they would be in bankruptcy.
81
 
 
2. IVAs provide debtors with debt composition and conditional release.  Invariably, in 
approved consumer IVAs, the debtors will agree to repay what they can reasonably 
afford over a defined period of time in return for the creditors’ agreement to accept 
less than 100 pence in the pound in full and final settlement subject to performance of 
the IVA terms.  It is standard practice to provide that debtors will be released from all 
the debts within the compass of their IVA provided that they comply fully or 
substantially with their IVA obligations, compliance to be certified by the 
supervisor.
82
  IVAs therefore offer the prospect of debt relief without the debtor 
having to petition for bankruptcy, albeit the discharge is partial − only an agreed 
proportion of the debts are written off − and conditional on debtor performance of the 
IVA terms.  Thus, the ‘fresh start’ has to ‘earned’: debtors who fail to comply with 
their IVA obligations risk being bankrupted.83 
 
                                          
81
 For the equivalent provisions applicable in bankruptcy see IA 1986 ss 285, 322, 328. 
82
 For an industry standard see IVA Forum, ‘Standard Conditions for Individual Voluntary Arrangements’ 
(revd 25 January 2008) 
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/policychange/foum2007/plenarymeetin
g.htm> clauses 6-7. 
83
 IA 1986 ss 264(1)(e), 276. 
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3. IVA debtors avoid the greater publicity and perceived stigma associated with 
bankruptcy.  The fact that a debtor has entered into an IVA is, like a bankruptcy 
order, a matter of public record in that it must be entered on the statutory insolvency 
register maintained by the Insolvency Service.
84
  It will therefore be picked up by the 
credit reference agencies.  There is, however, no requirement for IVAs to be gazetted 
or advertised in the press. 
 
4. IVAs provide debtors in certain occupational and professional groups with a debt 
relief alternative which, unlike bankruptcy, will not impact their ability (because of 
legal or professional rules) to continue in their occupation or profession. 
 
5. Debtors who have non-exempt assets and relatively stable incomes may be able to 
protect assets that they would have to surrender in bankruptcy by offering creditors a 
                                          
84
 IR 1986 rr 6A.1-6A.2.  In a recent survey, over 70 per cent of a sample of debtors gave answers that 
indicated a continuing perception of stigma attaching to bankruptcy.  See J Tribe, ‘Centre for Insolvency 
Law and Policy: Bankruptcy Courts Survey 2005 − A Pilot Study’ (2006) 
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/research/personaldocs/BankruptcyCour
tsSurvey.pdf> 104-107.  See also two reports prepared by the Insolvency Service, ‘Attitudes to Bankruptcy’ 
(2005) <http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/policychange/attitudes/report-
attitudestobankruptcy1.pdf>; ‘Attitudes to Bankruptcy Revisited’ (2007) 
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/policychange/ABrevisited/ABrevisited
Menu.htm>.  These report findings from surveys of various groups, including bankrupts, which corroborate 
Tribe’s findings.  In particular, bankrupts identified the publicity given to bankruptcy orders through 
advertisement and the signal that bankruptcy sends about debtors’ inability to meet their obligations as 
stigmatising factors. 
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higher proportion of their income by way of monthly contributions.  Thus, the 
intuition is that consumer debtors with assets and relatively higher incomes should, in 
theory, favour a bankruptcy alternative such as an IVA whereas consumer debtors 
with few assets and relatively lower incomes should favour bankruptcy.
85
 
 
6. Following on from the previous point, IVAs, in theory, provide salaried homeowners 
with a mechanism for protecting their homes.  In bankruptcy, the debtor’s interest in 
the home is at risk as it vests in the trustee for the benefit of creditors.  In an IVA, the 
debtor’s interest does not vest by operation of law in the supervisor; it remains with 
the debtor.  Thus, so long as debtors can maintain their mortgage repayments, their 
home is not at risk.  There is, however, a powerful creditor expectation that debtors 
who are salaried homeowners will release a portion of any equity that may accrue 
during the course of the IVA in addition to making monthly payments from income.
86
  
The industry standard requirement is an obligation on the debtor to re-mortgage 
towards the end of the IVA in order to release capital for the benefit of unsecured 
creditors who are bound into the arrangement.  In theory, if allowance is made for the 
debtor to continue paying the mortgage, this can be expected to reduce the amount of 
the debtor’s disposable income available for contributions towards repayment of 
unsecured debt.  Equity release provisions are therefore designed to compensate 
                                          
85
 Ziegel (n 8) 48. 
86
 This creditor expectation is now enshrined in the IVA Protocol on which see text to nn 140-142. 
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unsecured creditors for accepting lower monthly contributions during the life of the 
IVA which enable debtors to maintain in full their repayments to secured creditors.87 
 
IVAs also have theoretical advantages for creditors over bankruptcy: 
 
1. They offer the prospect of better returns than bankruptcy.
88
  It is understood 
anecdotally that consumer bankruptcy cases produce little by way of return to 
creditors.  In the case of salaried debtors IVAs should produce higher realisations 
from ongoing income because creditors can demand contributions from income for a 
longer period than the three years permitted in bankruptcy.89  In practice, IVA 
proposals are invariably drafted on the assumption that debtor contributions net of the 
IP’s costs and fees will generate more for creditors than bankruptcy.  The 
government’s current policy is to reinforce this assumption by engineering a 
reduction in the fixed costs associated with the IVA approval process with the aim of 
increasing net returns to creditors.
90
 
 
                                          
87
 Who enjoy statutory protection by virtue of IA 1986 s 258(4).  See text to nn 70-71. 
88
 For historic evidence, see Pond (n 21).  See also M Green, ‘IVAs, Over-indebtedness and the Insolvency 
Regime: Short Form Report’ (2002) 
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/policychange/ivapolicyresearch/shortfo
rmreport.doc>. 
89
 The industry standard is five years for IVAs: see text to nn 69-70, 140-141. 
90
 See further text to nn 111-113 on the forthcoming introduction of the simple IVA. 
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2. There may be reputational advantages for institutional creditors in supporting IVAs 
rather than resorting to bankruptcy as a collection device. 
 
Options for consumer debtors outside of IA 1986: informal debt resolution 
 
There is nothing to preclude consumer debtors from entering into informal arrangements 
for the rescheduling of debts with their creditors
91
 and a considerable market for non-
statutory debt management plans (‘DMPs’) has emerged in which there is a mix of 
private sector and third (voluntary) sector providers.
92
  DMPs are simply rescheduling 
agreements which extend the contractual period for repayment.  The standard pattern is 
that the debts are consolidated and the debtor pays an affordable monthly contribution to 
the provider who, in turn, distributes the payment among creditors.  DMPs usually 
provide for repayment in full over time or repayment on the terms of the DMP until such 
time as the debtor has sufficient resources to meet the repayments as originally 
contracted.  Costs vary according to the provider.  Some providers pass their costs onto 
the creditors while others charge the debtor but spread the cost over the lifetime of the 
arrangement.93 
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 Cork Report (n 1) 92. 
92
 See I Ramsay, ‘Bankruptcy in Transition: The Case of England and Wales’ in Niemi-Kiesiläinen et al (n 
4) 214-217. 
93
 To illustrate, say that Debtor needs to pay £200 per month for five years to pay off her debts and the 
DMP provider’s costs are 10 per cent of the total repayments (£1,200).  If the creditors bear the cost (as is 
the case with DMPs offered by some of the voluntary sector providers that are credit industry funded) the 
provider will distribute the proceeds to creditors net of the 10 per cent but this will be treated as payment in 
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DMPs may have advantages for some debtors, such as homeowners, as they can 
be entered into without assets having to be surrendered.  However, compared with 
bankruptcy and IVAs, they have several disadvantages.  They do not stay individual 
collection efforts (they are informal and no more legally binding than a unilateral promise 
to forbear).  Unlike IVAs, they do not provide a ‘cram down’ mechanism for dealing with 
dissentient creditors.  There is no guaranteed interest freeze and no debt relief.  The 
object of the exercise is simply to reduce monthly payments by stretching out the 
repayment period.  Ultimately the whole debt together with interest remains repayable 
and it follows that the higher the debtor’s debt to income ratio, the longer the DMP will 
need to last.  Anecdotally, it is understood that DMPs have been entered for periods of 
upwards of 10 years.  DMPs and their providers have hitherto been largely unregulated.94  
A form of statutory DMP has now been enacted although the relevant provisions have not 
come into force.
95
  These provisions would not prevent debtors from continuing to enter 
non-statutory DMPs. 
                                                                                                                             
full.  If Debtor is required to pay the costs, the repayment term would need to be extended by a further six 
months to cover the costs and return one hundred pence in the pound to creditors. 
94
 There is a requirement under the Consumer Credit Act 1974 for providers to hold a standard consumer 
credit license from the Office of Fair Trading if they carry out ‘ancillary credit business’ involving debt 
adjustment, counselling, collecting or administration relating to debts due under regulated consumer credit 
or consumer hire agreements.  DMP providers need a license because the average consumer’s debts are 
likely to include advances made under regulated agreements.  Moves have been made in the direction of 
greater self-regulation through the establishment of the Debt Resolution Forum: see 
<http://www.debtresolutionforum.org.uk/index.php> and text to n 137. 
95
 See Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 ss 109-133 and text to nn 144-145. 
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There are no reliable statistics indicating over time how many debtors have opted 
for DMPs.  The Insolvency Service has estimated that around 72,500 debtors signed up to 
DMPs in 2004 accounting for 59 per cent of debtors who entered a debt resolution 
process in that year (the figures for bankruptcy and IVAs were 29 per cent and 9 per cent 
respectively and the balance was made up by the lightly used county court administration 
order process).
96
  As these debtors are not counted in the insolvency statistics and are 
therefore hidden from view there is every reason to believe that the per capita rates for 
bankruptcies and IVAs do not accurately capture the full extent of consumer over-
indebtedness in England and Wales.
97
 
Aside from DMPs, the other route to informal resolution is some form of 
refinancing by way of consolidation loan or home equity release.  Refinancing involves 
the taking on of new debt to repay old debt – in the popular jargon the old is ‘rolled over’ 
into the new.  Refinancing solutions are therefore only viable for debtors who can 
realistically afford to service the new debt.  In the light of the ‘credit crunch’ it seems 
likely that sources of funds for refinancing will be scarcer and therefore more expensive 
especially for borrowers with impaired credit histories. 
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 Insolvency Service, ‘Improving Individual Voluntary Arrangements’ (2005) (‘Improving IVAs’) 
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/con_doc_register/improvingIVAs.pdf> 
11. 
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 See text to nn 22-24. 
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THE RISE OF IVAs 2003-2006 
 
Recall the story recounted earlier based on the official statistics.  Bankruptcies grew 
steadily between 2003 and 2006: 15.3% year on year in 2003 followed by straight line 
annual growth of roughly 30 per cent between 2004 and 2006).  However, IVAs grew 
much faster: 41.7 per cent in 2004; 88.7 per cent in 2005; 118.5 per cent in 2006.  
Debtors therefore opted for IVAs in ever increasing numbers, and yet, from 1 April 2004, 
this growth took place against the background of an apparent easing of the bankruptcy 
regime.  Although a streamlined procedure for consumer IVAs is now very much on the 
reform agenda,98 there have been no legislative changes of comparable significance to the 
IVA regime since it was introduced in the mid-1980s.99  So, not only did IVAs grow 
faster than bankruptcies between 2003 and 2006, they did so against a background in 
which the IVA regime did not change but the bankruptcy regime was (on one view) 
substantially liberalised.  This then is our first puzzle: why did IVAs suddenly become 
more popular during a period (especially from the second quarter of 2004) when many 
believed that bankruptcy would become more popular relative to IVAs? 
In the previous section, I considered a number of factors which may be thought to 
give IVAs an edge over bankruptcy for certain classes of debtor.  To reiterate, the main 
advantages of IVAs are: (i) debtors can avoid the greater publicity accorded to 
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 See text to nn 111-113. 
99
 Some changes were made by the Insolvency Act 2000, notably removal of the previous mandatory 
requirement for the debtor to apply to the court for an interim order (a form of stay) before making an IVA 
proposal to creditors.  Applications for an interim order are now optional: see IA 1986 ss 252-253, 256A.  
In practice, the majority of consumer debtors propose an IVA without first applying for an interim order. 
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bankruptcy; (ii) debtors within certain occupational groups can avoid the impact of 
bankruptcy on their occupational or professional status; (iii) debtors with assets 
(especially homes) and relatively stable incomes have some prospects of protecting their 
assets by proposing an IVA.  All of these advantages were available to debtors well 
before 2003 and at a time when bankruptcy was considered to be less liberal.  And yet 
IVA numbers were stable relative to bankruptcy numbers between 1999 and 2003 and 
actually declined in 2001 and 2002 while bankruptcy numbers were steadily growing. 
Did the sudden increase in the popularity of IVAs perhaps have something to do 
with the profile of debtors?  One possible theory is that there was a rising trajectory of 
financial distress among people for whom IVAs appear to be a natural solution: higher 
income debtors with assets to shelter; debtors in occupational or professional groups most 
impacted by bankruptcy.  However, this still begs the question why these ‘natural 
constituents’ would suddenly opt for IVAs rather than DMPs which can also be used to 
shelter assets and avoid the residual legal restrictions applicable to bankrupts. 
Furthermore, an analysis of over 6,000 IVAs entered into between July and 
November 2005 carried out by accountancy firm PricewaterhouseCoopers suggests that 
the average IVA debtor is likely to be ‘unskilled, earning less than £30,000 per annum 
and living in rented accommodation’.100  Although that evidence provides at best a 
statistically significant snapshot of IVA debtor profiles for five months in 2005, it offers 
some support for the view that IVAs have increasingly been populated by non-home-
owning salaried debtors as well as by ‘natural constituents’.  These debtors − salaried 
debtors who have little by way of assets to protect − may make candidates for IVAs if 
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 Living on Tick (n 20). 
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they can afford a sufficient monthly contribution to satisfy the demands of creditors.  
However, from their standpoint, the economic choice between bankruptcy and an IVA 
does not obviously favour the IVA.  It is not immediately clear why such debtors would 
voluntarily opt for a five-year payment plan (in accordance with prevailing creditor 
expectations) coupled with a long-term conditional discharge rather than a maximum 
three-year payment plan coupled with an automatic discharge after one year in 
bankruptcy.  Moreover, an IVA debtor who defaults on the IVA payments risks 
bankruptcy in any event.  A further point is that the credit industry does not appear to 
treat IVAs any more favourably than bankruptcy on the debtors’ credit histories at the 
point of entry.  The credit reference agencies simply classify entry into any formal 
insolvency procedure as ‘default’ though there may be some positive adjustment to the 
debtor’s credit history in the event that an IVA is successfully completed.
101
  It is true 
that debtors who go bankrupt are subjected to more intensive scrutiny and publicity than 
is the case with IVA debtors.  It is also true that debtors risk the imposition of post-
discharge restrictions in bankruptcy, although in practice the risk is less than 5 per cent 
because of practical constraints on the capacity of the Insolvency Service to investigate 
and process cases.102  Thus, on balance, there seems to be a clear case for saying that 
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 See Is a Voluntary Arrangement Right for Me? (n 75). 
102
 The Service secured 1,867 bankruptcy restrictions orders and undertakings in its financial year ended 31 
March 2007.  See Insolvency Service, Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07 (HC 752) 18.  There is a time 
lag between a debtor being made bankrupt and being made subject to post-discharge bankruptcy 
restrictions.  But on a crude approximation based on a conservative bankruptcy rate of say 50,000 per 
annum and a generous bankruptcy restrictions rate of 2,000 per annum, only around 4 per cent of debtors 
P
e-Print
 39 
these debtors would be financially better off in bankruptcy.  That they have opted for 
IVAs instead tends to imply that non-economic factors − perceptions of stigma associated 
with bankruptcy, concerns about additional publicity and scrutiny or even a moral 
impulse to repay as much as possible − may outweigh economic factors in influencing 
debtor behaviour.
103
 
So far I have presented the choice between bankruptcy and IVA on the 
assumption that debtors will calculate the relative costs and benefits and act accordingly.  
But this rational choice calculus, which prioritises human agency-based explanations of 
behaviour over structural explanations, ignores the point that the ‘choice’ of option is 
very likely to be influenced by the debtor’s interactions with the wide range of 
intermediaries in the public, private and voluntary sectors that offer debt advice and ‘debt 
solutions’.  The role of intermediaries is likely to be particularly significant where the 
‘choice’ is complex and finely balanced as appears to be the case for salaried debtors who 
do not own their homes, have few or no high value assets and for whom bankruptcy 
poses no threat to occupational or professional status.  Thus, we cannot arrive at a 
complete understanding of what happened between 2003 and 2006 without an account of 
how the market has developed on the supply side.  Even assuming that IVAs have a 
natural constituency of debtors, there needs to be provision in the market to meet rising 
demand.  It follows that institutional explanations of the rise of IVAs on the supply side 
                                                                                                                             
entering bankruptcy can expect to have to suffer post-discharge restrictions.  At the current bankruptcy rate 
of over 60,000, the percentage is likely to be even lower. 
103
 See Insolvency Service (n 84) suggesting that bankruptcy is perceived as being stigmatising precisely 
because it indicates failure to pay debts.  Of course, IVA providers in the private sector have good 
incentives to ‘talk up’ the stigmatising effects of bankruptcy through the advice they offer. 
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are at least as important as (if not more important than) behavioural explanations on the 
demand side.  Indeed, it is arguable that the significant changes in the market for debt 
resolution outlined below were the single most critical explanatory variable on the 
assumption that supply-side actors not only meet demand but also help to create it. 
 
Explaining the rise of IVAs: the role of IVA factories 
 
The exponential growth in IVA numbers occurred against the background of significant 
changes in the market for debt resolution characterised by the emergence of powerful 
new players offering commoditised volume ‘debt solutions’ to hard pressed consumer 
debtors.  These players − sometimes pejoratively referred to as ‘IVA factories’ − have 
constructed business models which enable them to process high volumes of debtors 
through IVAs.  A number of volume providers controlling between them high levels of 
market share established themselves rapidly.
104
  Some of these leading firms acquired 
stock market listings.  It is essentially this shift towards volume provision that drove the 
transformation of the IVA from a restructuring tool for self-employed debtors and 
professionals into a ‘debt solution’ for salaried consumer debtors. 
The emergence of the factories amounted to a second stage in the evolution of 
volume provision of consumer debt resolution within the private sector.  The first stage 
was the emergence of the unregulated debt management sector.  Fee charging debt 
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 Based on an analysis of the individual insolvency register (on file with author), Michael Green of the 
University of Wales, Bangor has established that between 1995 and 2005 the market share captured by the 
top 20 firms by volume of IVAs arranged increased from less than 39% to around 82%.  Moreover, nearly 
half of the top 20 firms by volume in 2005 had only entered the market in 2001. 
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management companies offering DMPs grew strongly during the 1990s as an alternative 
source of provision to third sector debt advisory services offered by organisations such as 
Citizens Advice and the Money Advice Trust.  This was a period in which IVAs were 
stuck in a range of around 4,000 to 5,000 per annum, were still being used primarily by 
self-employed traders and professionals as was originally intended, and were being set 
up, more often than not, by small independent firms of insolvency practitioners.
105
  
Notwithstanding its statutory monopoly, it appears that the IP profession was not well 
geared up to exploit increasing demand from consumers for debt resolution through the 
medium of IVAs.  There were a number of structural barriers.  IPs have traditionally 
tended to operate along professional service lines with the vast majority of their fees 
deriving from corporate insolvency and restructuring work.  Their principal sources of 
referrals are banks, accountants and solicitors, a referral network that works well in 
generating corporate case loads but does not connect with the public at large.  A further 
barrier was that IPs were (and remain) subject to professional restrictions on advertising 
and on paying commissions to introducers of business with a view to securing 
appointments.
106
  It has been argued that the IP profession’s failure to capitalise on the 
rising tide of consumer over-indebtedness amounted to a failure of entrepreneurship.107 
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 Pond (n 21). 
106
 In seeking publicity for and/or advertising his or her services an IP must act consistently with ‘the 
dignity of the profession’ and ‘should not project an image inconsistent with that of a professional person 
bound to high ethical and technical standards’.  See Insolvency Service, ‘A Guide to Advertising and 
Publicity’ (1999) <http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/iparea/iparea.htm>.  
Payments or commissions offered to introducers of business are also considered unethical because they 
may compromise the integrity and objectivity of the IP in taking the insolvency appointment.  See 
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The gap in the market was exploited by entrepreneurial new entrants who learned 
from the success of the early debt management companies.  These entrepreneurs realised 
that IVAs could be offered to the public much in the same way as DMPs through a 
combination of high profile advertising and volume business processes.  Some of the new 
providers were set up specifically to offer IVAs as a main service line while others were 
established by existing debt management companies.
108
  In some cases there was explicit 
targeting of groups whose occupational status would be threatened if they opted for 
bankruptcy. 
Given the IP profession’s statutory monopoly, the new providers could not offer 
IVAs unless they could bring IPs into the business to act as nominees and supervisors.  
The business model which emerged is one in which a handful of IPs are employed by the 
provider to process high volumes of IVAs after initial screening has been carried out by 
low paid staff in a call centre or over the internet using a financial template designed to 
identify whether an IVA is a viable solution appropriate to the debtor’s circumstances.  
Each element of the process is handled by different teams of staff in order to create an 
                                                                                                                             
Insolvency Service, ‘Guidance on Ethics and Professional Conduct’ also available via the previous web 
link. 
107
 Green (n 88). 
108
 An example of the former is Debt Free Direct and of the latter is Blair Endersby which was established 
by the leading DMP provider Baines and Ernst: see <http://www.debtfreedirect.co.uk/history.php> and 
<http://www.blairendersby.co.uk/who-are-we>. 
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efficient division of labour.
109
  Once the initial contact, known in the industry as a ‘lead’, 
yields the possibility of an IVA, one team verifies the financial information provided by 
the debtor and generates a draft proposal for consideration and review by an ‘in house’ 
IP, another team handles the approval process and yet another team supports performance 
of the IP’s supervisory and collection functions post-approval.  By around 2003 volume 
providers generating IVAs on this kind of platform had gained a foothold in the market 
alongside the debt management companies, the free advice sector and lenders offering 
consolidation loans and equity release. 
The growth in high profile volume provision of IVAs appears to have had at least 
two effects which go a long way to explaining the increase in take up between 2003 and 
2006.  Firstly, it provided a more visible alternative to bankruptcy for consumer debtors 
who wished to avoid bankruptcy.  Secondly, it seems to have attracted debtors who might 
otherwise have entered DMPs or who were already in long dated DMPs with many years 
still to run.  In other words, on the balance of probabilities, there was not only an impact 
on the overall composition of formal insolvencies but debtors also switched from 
informal to formal debt resolution.  In the absence of reliable data on DMP volumes it is 
not possible to measure the size of any switching effect.  However, it does seem likely 
that the expansion of volume IVA provision stimulated a switching effect from DMPs to 
IVAs as the latter acquired media profile and became more widely available.
110
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 For consideration of the kind of business process models that IVA firms use see Walters & Seneviratne 
(n 60) 30-34.  Naturally, IVA firms do not operate on the model of a traditional provider of professional 
services. 
110
 Living on Tick (n 20).  See also Ramsay (n 92) 223 on the possibility of a ‘substitution effect’ away from 
long-term DMPs towards debt-relief mechanisms. 
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Government policy 
 
These developments on the supply side of the consumer debt resolution market have 
occurred in a broadly supportive policy environment.  Government policy rests on the 
premise that IVAs are the best instrument for balancing the interests of debtors and 
creditors within the context of a credit society.  In other words IVAs are thought of as a 
‘win, win’: good for institutional creditors who over a run of cases should generate better 
returns from IVAs than from bankruptcies; good for debtors who in return for a defined 
period of financial discipline will get some measure of debt relief in contrast to DMPs, 
which offer no such prospect, and may last indefinitely.  Indirectly, IVAs may also 
promote financial responsibility and financial rehabilitation as they require debtors to 
commit to a strict budget: the ‘fresh start’ has to be earned.  The following extract from a 
2007 government consultation document reflects these various strands of current 
policy:
111
 
 
The IVA provides a flexible solution to a debtor’s financial problems, balancing a 
debtor’s need for certainty of reasonable payments over a set, planned timetable, 
against the need to maximise returns to creditors.  An IVA is less punitive on the 
debtor (in terms of the restrictions imposed) than bankruptcy but it is not a soft 
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 Insolvency Service, ‘A consultation document on proposed changes to the IVA regime’ (2007) 
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/con_doc_register/proposedchangestoI
VA.pdf> 3, 9. 
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option.  An IVA requires commitment from the debtor as it is legally binding, 
publicly recorded and if it fails, the debtor can still be made bankrupt. 
 
This policy thinking has been translated into reform.  The government is expected 
to introduce a new ‘simple’ IVA (‘SIVA’) − a streamlined IVA designed for consumer 
debtors who have undisputed unsecured debts of £75,000 or less − in late-2008 or early-
2009.  The current IVA procedure will be retained for debtors (business or consumer) 
whose debts exceed £75,000.
112
  The SIVA is an interesting example of contemporary 
law reform in that the Insolvency Service derived much of its content from the 
deliberations of a working group the members of which included representatives from the 
credit industry and from the volume providers.  The aim of the reform is to reduce fixed 
costs associated with the current procedure that have to be incurred regardless of the size 
of the debtor’s liabilities.  So, for example, it is proposed to replace the current 
mandatory requirement for a ‘real’ creditors’ meeting with the use of voting by 
correspondence and to remove several of the IP’s existing reporting requirements.  Some 
dilution of creditors’ rights is also contemplated.  Creditors will no longer be permitted to 
seek modifications of the proposed IVA terms − it will be a case of ‘take it or leave it’ − 
and the threshold for approval of IVA proposals will be reduced from the present level of 
in excess of 75 per cent of creditors by value to a simple majority by value.  The theory is 
that by reducing fixed costs that are currently unavoidable there will be a corresponding 
increase in net returns to creditors. 
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 Ibid. For further background, see McKenzie Skene & Walters (n 11); Improving IVAs (n 96). 
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Public choice theorists
113
 will probably not be surprised by the government’s 
championing of consumer IVAs and its attempts (with stakeholder input) to streamline 
provision.  If there were a substitution from IVAs into bankruptcy this could see 
bankruptcy numbers edging closer to the 100,000 per annum mark.  Higher bankruptcy 
numbers would require a considerable further expansion of state provision and 
infrastructure through the OR network which could well stretch the Insolvency Service to 
breaking point.
114
  Equally, a substitution from IVAs back into DMPs would increase 
demand for greater regulation of debt management companies.  In present conditions, the 
promotion of a market for private bankruptcy serviced by licensed professionals (albeit 
within a model of volume provision) may be seen as a means of achieving an optimal 
balance between public and private sector provision of the ‘fresh start’.  The financial 
discipline of the IVA (as the extract above suggests) also offers a useful riposte to 
arguments that generous provision of debt relief engenders ‘moral hazard’.  Thus, it is 
suggested that developments on the supply side of the market have driven the growth of 
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 See generally, D Skeel Jr, ‘Public Choice and the Future of Public Choice-Influenced Legal 
Scholarship’ (1998) 50 Vanderbilt LR 647. 
114
 Further administrative burdens are already in the pipeline for the ORs.  First, the Tribunals, Courts and 
Enforcement Act 2007 introduces debt relief orders, a form of administrative bankruptcy for in pauperis 
debtors who satisfy defined financial eligibility criteria.  Secondly, proposals to remove the involvement of 
the court from debtor self-initiated bankruptcies are well advanced: see Insolvency Service, ‘Bankruptcy: 
proposals for reform of the debtor petition process’ (2007) 
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/con_doc_register/registerindex.htm>.  
These proposals would transform debtor-initiated bankruptcy into a largely administrative process under 
the aegis of the ORs. 
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the IVA market
115
 within a policy environment in which the government has had no 
obvious incentive to hold the market back. 
 
THE STALLING OF IVA GROWTH IN 2007-2008 
 
This brings me to the second puzzle about IVAs.  After the stellar growth of IVAs in the 
period 2003 to 2006, the overall rate of individual insolvencies dropped away slightly in 
2007, a decline attributable entirely to a 5% fall in new IVAs.  IVA numbers have 
continued to decline in the first two quarters of 2008.
116
  If personal insolvency rates are 
simply a function of the amount of credit in the economy subject to a time lag then it 
could be that the numbers have simply peaked and are now on their way down correlating 
positively to credit conditions that were already tightening even before the onset of the 
‘credit crunch’ in Autumn 2007.
117
  However, ‘macro’ explanations of this kind speak 
only to the aggregate number of personal insolvencies.  They do not explain the decline 
in new IVA approvals as a proportion of personal insolvencies. 
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 See PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘Precious Plastic 2007 – Consumer credit in the UK’ 
<http://www.pwc.co.uk/eng/publications/secure/precious_plastic_2007_consumer_credit_in_the_uk.html>: 
‘Our analysis indicates that cyclical factors alone would not have resulted in the sharp rise in insolvencies.  
The consumer credit boom has created a fertile environment in which debt advisers have been able to 
promote the IVA.  The industry that has developed around this arrangement has certainly played an 
important role.’  See also __‘IVA factories fuel insolvency boom’ Guardian (London May 4, 2007). 
116
 In Q1 new IVAs were down 22% on Q1, 2007.  In Q2 new IVAs were down 12.4% on Q2, 2007.  See 
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/otherinformation/statistics/insolv.htm>. 
117
 See __‘Sounding the Retreat’ Economist (London 13 July 2006). 
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 It appears that much of the explanation for declining IVA numbers during 2007 
and the first half of 2008 lies in the behaviour patterns of repeat players within the credit 
industry.  Under the current law an IVA can only take effect if it is approved by in excess 
of 75% of the creditors who cast a vote.  Ultimately, the consumer IVA market functions 
on the basis of continuous interaction between the providers and credit industry repeat 
players, principally banks, credit card companies and the intermediaries whom they 
appoint to represent their interests in the IVA process.
118
  Institutional creditors or 
intermediaries who can control or co-ordinate up to a maximum of 25% of debt by value, 
are in a position to determine the outcome.
119
  Credit industry repeat players are therefore 
a powerful and concentrated source of discipline within the market for IVAs.  They are in 
a position to influence the outcome of many consumer IVA proposals and to dictate 
overall industry standards.  It follows that if the credit industry loses faith in the providers 
and the IVA ‘product’ to deliver what are considered ‘acceptable’ returns, the number of 
IVA approvals is likely to go down all other things being equal. 
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 A leading intermediary is TiX which is part of the TDX group: see 
<http://www.tdxgroup.com/TIX.html>.  The major credit providers have tended to outsource management 
of IVAs proposed by their customers to intermediaries such as TiX who act both as voting agents 
(analysing and deciding whether to accept proposals) and collection agents (monitoring the progress of 
IVAs post-approval and managing recoveries). 
119
 This assumes that all creditors who are eligible to vote will vote one way or the other.  If creditors do 
not all take an active interest in the approval process then, in practice, a creditor holding significantly less 
than 25% by value of the overall debt will often be in a position to determine the outcome as approval 
depends only on achieving the required threshold of votes in favour as a proportion of votes actually cast 
rather than as a proportion of total debt. 
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Against a background of increasing bank write-offs on unsecured lending to 
individuals during 2005 and 2006, which coincided with rising numbers of IVA 
approvals,120 it is clear that there was a very considerable loss of faith on the part of the 
credit industry during 2007.  Two leading volume providers announced profits warnings 
to the stock market in January 2007 citing ‘creditor posturing’ as the main reason for 
downwards pressure on IVA approvals and therefore on earnings.
121
  Later in the year, a 
third large provider (one that had been in the top three by volume of new IVAs set up 
during 2003 to 2006) put its IVA business up for sale.
122
  These developments were born 
out of a concerted backlash against the volume providers that had already begun before 
the end of 2006. 
The first stage of the backlash was a sustained call by the credit industry for 
greater government regulation of the IVA providers.
123
  Concerns were voiced about 
misleading advertising,
124
 quality of advice,
125
 IP costs and the reliability of the 
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 See Bank of England, ‘Monetary and Financial Statistics’ (July 2008) Table C2.1 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/ms/current/index.htm>.  See also __‘Prudential blames IVAs 
for losses at Egg’ Financial Times (London 19 October 2006). 
121
 __‘Their pain, your gain’ Investors Chronicle (London 23 February 2007); __‘Accuma shedding 
reliance on IVAs’ Financial Times (London 19 October 2007). 
122
 ‘Intermediaries under strain as banks cut cost of rescheduling’ FinanceWeek (Bristol 14 February 2008); 
__‘IVA shares plunge amid profitability concerns’ Guardian (London 2 October 2007). 
123
 ‘More regulation of IVAs rejected’ BBC News (13 October 2006) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6047070.stm>. 
124
 This prompted regulatory action by the Office of Fair Trading over IVA advertising.  See __‘OFT warns 
IVA providers over misleading adverts’ (Press Release 8/07, 17 January 2007) 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2007/8-07>.  The main target was the false claim made by some 
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providers’ due diligence processes for verifying the financial information upon which 
IVA proposals are based.  In short, institutional creditors appear increasingly to have lost 
confidence in the providers to put forward IVAs that would stand the test of time, 
complete successfully and deliver better net returns than bankruptcy (discounting the 
present value of projected returns over the life of the IVA to reflect the risk of debtor 
default prior to successful completion). 
 The second and more decisive stage in the creditor assault on IVAs was a 
determined attempt by creditors through their intermediaries to stiffen the criteria on 
which they were prepared to vote in favour of IVAs.  In particular, creditors began 
increasingly to insist on ‘hurdle rates’ and ceilings on fees.126  Hurdle rates are minimum 
projected rates of return.  So, for example, a group of banks might insist on a projected 
rate of return of at least 40 pence in the pound as a pre-condition for approving IVAs 
regardless of the individual circumstances of debtors.  Several of the large banks also 
insisted that the provider’s fees should not exceed prescribed levels expressed as a 
percentage of the debtor’s projected monthly payments.  Proposals that did not meet the 
                                                                                                                             
providers that an IVA could wipe off ‘up to 90 per cent of your debt’.  Living on Tick (n 20) suggests that 
the average projected dividend is around 37 pence in the pound which, assuming successful completion of 
the IVA, would mean only a 63 per cent write-off.  Assuming a normal distribution of values with a low 
standard deviation, IVAs leading to write-offs of 75 per cent or more are likely to be outliers. 
125
 The volume providers have responded to doubts over quality of advice and conflicts of interest by 
pointing to industry conversion rates of around 5 per cent − that is only 5 per cent of ‘leads’ (debtors who 
are referred to the providers or who contact them for advice) converted into approved IVAs.  They argue 
that if there were widespread ‘misselling’, the conversion rate would be much higher. 
126
 The prime mover was TiX.  See eg __‘Insolvency rule changes set to cut practitioners’ fees’ Financial 
Times (London 18 July 2007). 
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hurdle rate or comply with the fee cap became liable to rejection out of hand.  This 
approach appears to have had a number of consequences.  Firstly, it reinforced a rising 
trend of outright rejections by creditors without any consideration of the merits of the 
individual debtor’s proposal.
127
  Secondly, it increased the prospect that some debtors 
would accede to creditor pressure to contribute more than they could reasonably afford 
leading to approval of unsustainable IVAs and the likelihood of early failure with little or 
no benefit to debtors or creditors.  Thirdly, it imposed significant downward pressure on 
fees (hence the profit warnings alluded to above) with implications for providers’ 
margins and business models and for debtors for whom an IVA might have been 
appropriate but who had insufficient income to meet and sustain the levels of contribution 
demanded by creditors.  Fourthly, it threatened to drive lower volume operators among 
the traditional IP community out of the market altogether.  Indeed, those in the IP 
community who felt most squeezed by the stiffening of creditor approval criteria cried 
foul, launching attacks on the volume providers and the banks accusing them both of 
rigging the market.
128
  Debtors whose IVAs might otherwise have been affordable and 
viable were caught in the crossfire as the creditors’ grip on the market effectively raised 
the barrier to entry.  These debtors were restricted to a choice between bankruptcy or a 
DMP or left at the mercy of the increasingly aggressive collection efforts of some banks 
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 See __‘Northern Rock accused of bullying debtors’ Observer (London 30 September 2007); ‘Debtors 
deserve a choice’ Recovery (Summer 2008) 22. 
128
 This is reflected in a members’ update issued by the Association of Business Recovery Professionals 
(R3), the IP trade association on 29 August 2007: see <http://myvesta.org.uk/articles/articles/3942/1/R3-
Takes-TIX-Desire-to-Control-the-IVA-and-Insolvency-Practitioners-Seriously/Page1.html>. 
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under ordinary debtor-creditor law.
129
  Consumer organisations and professional 
networks of IPs have added further to the pressure on the volume providers by 
questioning whether they provide appropriate advice and whether bankruptcy (which the 
volume providers have no economic incentive to promote) may not a better option for 
debtors than an IVA in many cases.
130
 
 
Understanding creditor behaviour 
 
It is clear then that conflict between institutional creditors and the volume providers 
accounts for the stalling of the IVA market in 2007.  The question this begs is: why were 
creditors prepared to risk forcing consumer debtors who might otherwise have entered 
viable IVAs into bankruptcy which would be projected to generate lower returns even 
assuming three years’ worth of income payments? 
 One theory is that the imposition of hurdle rates and fee caps was a hard-nosed 
attempt by institutional creditors to channel debtors away from the volume providers, and 
more generally from debt solutions delivered by licensed IPs, towards their own direct 
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collection functions or towards preferred intermediaries that they control and fund within 
the debt management sector.  This may be thought of as a process of disintermediation in 
which the major banks and consumer credit providers reassert direct control over their 
over-indebted customers in order either to pursue aggressive recovery through ordinary 
debt collection methods supplemented by enforcement techniques such as charging 
orders
131
 or to cross-sell informal resolution options such as debt management or loan 
consolidation without incurring the additional costs associated with IP intermediaries.  
There is anecdotal evidence that certain banks have used their votes to reject their 
customers’ IVA proposals and then followed up with the offer of a consolidation loan 
shortly afterwards.  It has also been suggested that banks have perverse incentives to 
prefer DMPs to IVAs because the former receive a more favourable accounting 
treatment.  Apparently, debts subject to a statutory insolvency solution such as an IVA 
must be written off in full at the point of entry whereas the same is not true of debts 
subject to DMPs.
132
  In these troubled times for the banking industry, DMPs may 
therefore have less impact than IVAs on the bottom line, at least in the short term. 
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CONCLUSION: FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR CONSUMER IVAs 
 
This article has sought to demonstrate that the rise of the IVA to the status of a prominent 
‘debt solution’ for consumers was predominantly market-driven and that the subsequent 
failure of the market to expand further can be explained by the conflict between its main 
participants − volume providers and institutional creditors − over quality of advice issues 
and approval criteria.  In the present economic climate − which in England and Wales is 
characterised by rising inflation, rising credit costs, falling house prices and the legacy of 
rapid consumer credit expansion over the last fifteen years − there is every reason to 
believe that demand for consumer debt resolution will increase in the short term. 
In this climate, IVAs would appear to have a useful role to play, especially as a 
debt relief mechanism for consumer debtors who are both salaried and propertied.  
Indeed, the attractiveness of the consumer IVA in policy terms seems unassailable.  IVAs 
strike a balance between debtors and creditors.  They offer debt relief in return for a 
considerable quid pro quo in terms of financial contribution and discipline: the fresh start 
− a clean slate and an opportunity to rejoin the ‘credit society’ − has to be ‘earned’.  To 
borrow a phrase from Jason Kilborn, IVAs can be theorised as ‘a responsible reaction to 
the challenges of the open credit economy’.133  Moreover, there are potential ‘spill over’ 
benefits in the form of financial responsibility and rehabilitation: the possible educative 
value of working to a managed budget; the scope for debtors who successfully complete 
their IVAs to repair their credit histories and engage in financial planning for the future.  
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On this last point, some of the providers have grasped that debtors who succeed in IVAs 
make good prospective customers for savings and pensions products and there are signs 
that a market in financial services for IVA ‘survivors’ may be emerging. 
Even if we accept that the policy is enlightened and the IVA is a socially desirable 
means of resolving consumer over-indebtedness in our version of the ‘credit society’, the 
present conflict between the main players in the market threatens to undermine provision.  
There remain concerns that IVAs are being ‘missold’: in other words, that unscrupulous 
providers are persuading debtors to enter into inappropriate and unsustainable IVAs that 
may generate sufficient contributions to cover the nominee’s fee but ultimately leave the 
debtor still owing the original debts, exposed to bankruptcy or some other form of 
recovery process and therefore worse rather than better off.  The risk of ‘misselling’ is, 
however, mitigated by a number of factors: 
 
1. Providers that wish to remain in business have powerful economic and reputational 
incentives to set up viable IVAs in order to maintain market credibility and cash flow. 
 
2. The market has undergone a process of consolidation which has led to convergence 
on a ‘one-stop shop’ model of debt resolution provision.  Most of the major volume 
providers have become what I have termed ‘integrated solutions providers’
134
 offering 
a range of different debt resolution options, not just IVAs or debt management.  This 
to some extent mitigates the risk that quality of advice could be undermined by 
conflicts of interest. 
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3. Integrated solutions providers are regulated by the Office of Fair Trading under the 
consumer credit licensing regime.  The OFT issued guidance in 2001 setting out the 
minimum standards to be met by debt management companies if they are to be judged 
fit to hold a consumer credit licence.
135
  In January 2007, the guidance was clarified 
to make it clear that licensees who offer advice and assistance with the setting up of 
IVAs are regarded by the OFT as ‘debt management companies’ falling within its 
regulatory ambit.  With effect from 6 April 2007, debtors can bring complaints about 
providers − which could include complaints about ‘misselling’ − to the Financial 
Ombudsman who has extensive powers to order redress.
136
 
 
4. Several of the leading integrated solutions providers have joined together to promote 
self-regulation through the establishment in October 2006 of the Debt Resolution 
Forum to ‘provide a voice for the industry and… set best practice standards for 
members.’
137
  These players have commercial interests and market share to protect.  It 
is therefore in their interests to commit to self-regulation for all the usual reasons: 
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management of reputational risk; maintenance of confidence among consumers and 
creditors; raising the bar for new entrants to the market. 
 
5. The IP licensing bodies have also customised their approach to monitoring the fitness 
to act of IPs involved in volume provision.
138
  They now assess the whole advice 
process from initial contact through to approval.  They also monitor conversion and 
early failure rates.  The conversion rate measures the proportion of people seeking 
advice from a provider that actually end up doing an IVA.  A low conversion rate − 
and historically across the industry the rate has been well under 10% − tends to imply 
that IVAs are, on the whole, being appropriately targeted.  The early failure rate 
measures the proportion of a provider’s IVAs that fail in the first year.  Needless to 
say, the higher the rate, the greater the cause for concern about the quality of the 
advice that debtors are receiving. 
 
These factors notwithstanding, the view persists in some quarters that bankruptcy may 
often be at least as good, if not a better option, than an IVA especially for salaried debtors 
who own few assets.  Those that subscribe to this view would point to the providers’ lack 
of powerful financial incentives to recommend the bankruptcy option. 
The risk of market failure does not arise solely from the risk of possible 
‘misselling’ by the providers.  The market rests on an interdependent relationship 
between providers (who desire to earn fees) and institutional creditors (who desire to 
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maximise net recoveries).
139
  The stance taken by creditors on fees and hurdle rates is 
consistent up to a point with their desire to maximise recoveries.  However, it may lead 
some debtors to offer more than they can realistically afford in order to secure approval, 
thus increasing the risk of early failure, while denying other debtors access to a 
sustainable and sensible solution that is projected to deliver ‘better than bankruptcy’ but 
‘lower than hurdle rate’ returns.  In this way, the market may operate to constrain debtor 
choice and frustrate public policy unless its participants can be persuaded that co-
operation, rather than conflict, is in their mutual interests. 
Given its policy commitment to consumer IVAs, the government through the 
Insolvency Service has taken steps to promote co-operation and build trust between the 
key players.  In November 2007, industry participants including representatives of the 
providers and the British Bankers Association agreed an IVA Protocol for 
straightforward consumer IVAs.  This is a voluntary industry code brokered by the 
Insolvency Service which establishes a standard framework for dealing with consumer 
IVAs.
140
  If the debtor’s proposal is put forward in accordance with Protocol processes 
and on agreed standard terms, the creditors are expected to approve it.  The Protocol is 
designed to embrace both homeowners and non-homeowners.  It requires providers to (i) 
comply with Office of Fair Trading guidance on advertising; (ii) ensure that debtors 
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receive full information on the advantages and disadvantages of all available debt 
resolution processes (which information is to be standardised across the industry); (iii) 
follow prescribed due diligence processes as regards verification of the debtor’s income 
and expenditure; (iv) calculate contributions using standard form financial statements and 
agreed guidelines on allowable expenditure.  It also entrenches as the default model a 
five-year IVA with homeowners to release equity above a £5,000 de minimis, but within 
specified limits, during the fifth year of the arrangement.  No provision is made in the 
Protocol for dealing with fees as it was considered that any attempt to negotiate a fee cap 
or parameters for fees would render it susceptible to challenge under competition law as a 
price-fixing agreement.141  Creditors are not bound to approve a Protocol compliant IVA 
but they have agreed to disclose their reasons for voting against such IVAs to the 
provider.  However, there is an expectation that creditors will generally approve Protocol 
IVAs without modification ‘wherever possible’.  The Protocol is a deft attempt by the 
Insolvency Service to intervene in support of its policy in the hope that more drastic 
legislative intervention − which would be costly and troublesome to achieve − can be 
avoided.  The government’s approach, expressed in more ideological language, is well 
captured by the following extract from a public statement made by the Insolvency 
Service’s chief executive:142 
 
What governments try to do is create markets that work; they don’t take a 
commercial position…The protocol should give the customer more clarity and 
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improve trust in the process.  In this way, government can lubricate a market 
without having to regulate it.  My hope and expectation is that as the protocol 
starts to take effect financial institutions and creditors will start to see that 
excessive hurdle rates are not in their interest. 
 
It remains to be seen whether a voluntary code will successfully ‘lubricate’ the 
market.  The operation of the Protocol is being kept under review by a standing 
committee populated by representatives from the credit industry, the providers and the IP 
community.  The creditors appear to be hedging their bets.  Another interesting feature of 
the Protocol is that debtors are required to disclose previous attempts to deal with their 
financial problems and explain why these were unsuccessful.  The implication is that 
debtors should pursue informal solutions to their problems by speaking directly to their 
main creditors first instead of jumping straight into an IVA.  This sort of approach − in 
which the banks strive to maintain control over their own customers − is in keeping with 
the process of informal resolution through bank-customer dialogue envisaged in the 
recently revamped Banking Code.
143
 
The impression that the consumer IVA market is at a crossroads is reinforced by 
two other developments the consequences of which are difficult to predict.  The first one 
is the simple IVA reform discussed earlier.
144
  This is expected to make it onto the statute 
book in late 2008 or early 2009.  In theory, the SIVA reduces the providers’ costs 
therefore making SIVAs more palatable to creditors who also have less scope to block 
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them because of the change to simple majority voting.  The second is the introduction in 
sections 109-133 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 of a statutory debt 
management framework.  This reform has been promoted separately by the Ministry of 
Justice.  It will enable debtors to propose a statutory debt repayment plan with facility for 
partial repayment and discharge as long as the debtor keeps to the plan.  The debtor will 
benefit from a stay and an interest freeze at the point of entry.  Strikingly, there will be no 
creditor approval mechanism, although creditors will have limited rights to apply to court 
to challenge the inclusion of their debt or the plan terms.  It will only be possible for 
approved operators to offer statutory debt repayment plans.  Assuming these provisions 
are brought into force, statutory debt repayment plans will offer a functional substitute for 
IVAs that can be offered to the public without the involvement of IPs.  This further 
expansion of consumer ‘choice’
145
 may therefore have considerable future implications 
for IVAs and SIVAs.  On the other hand, there are reasons to be sceptical about the long 
term prospects for this latest initiative given that it involves a significant erosion of 
creditor rights. 
It is clear that the future prospects for IVAs and SIVAs are for the most part in the 
hands of institutional creditors many of whom are under pressure in the current economic 
climate.  As I have sought to demonstrate, these creditors appear to have good incentives 
to pursue alternative strategies beyond the pale of insolvency law for managing their 
recoveries.  Consolidation among the providers coupled with the re-establishment of trust 
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through the Protocol may lead to a period of relative stability and permit a further steady 
expansion of IVA numbers.  However, were IVA (SIVA) numbers to creep up towards 
50,000 per annum against a background of increasing write-offs, it seems realistic to 
suppose that creditors would once again threaten to desert the process.  The likelihood of 
such a prospect would increase further if IVAs brokered in the more benign economic 
conditions of 2005 and 2006 turn out to have high early failure rates.  Given the rising 
cost of living, creditors will also have to temper their expectations as regards rates of 
return if the market is to generate affordable and sustainable IVAs. 
No doubt, the government will be praying that the Protocol sticks.  The fear 
otherwise is that increasing numbers of consumer debtors will be forced into bankruptcy 
or onto the treadmill of long term debt management.  More bankruptcies will put the OR 
network under severe strain and could prompt a creditor backlash against the ‘debtor 
friendliness’ of the Enterprise Act reforms.  In the longer term, it will be interesting to see 
what impact the introduction of SIVAs and statutory debt repayment plans have on the 
overall picture.  The only thing that seems certain is that powerful market actors − 
principally institutional creditors − will continue to play a critical role in shaping the 
increasingly complex choices that insolvent consumers face in dealing with their 
financial problems. 
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